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The pilot judgment procedure is 
relatively new for the European 
Court of Human Rights (the 
Court). It was envisaged, along with other 
measures, by the Steering Committee for 
Human Rights of the Council of Europe 
in its report of 9 April 2003 ‘Guaranteeing 
the Long Term Effectiveness of the 
Control System of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, to reduce 
the significant workload which repetitive 
cases represent for the Court. The Committee 
proposed that where a case exposes 
a “structural or general shortcoming in 
the law or the practice of the State which 
may lead to a large number of complaints 
before the Court concerning the same 
State party”, the Court should deliver a 
“pilot judgment” which would “determine 
the point of law involved from the 
angle of the Convention in a way which 
would give sufficient guiding elements to 
allow for the determination of the merits 
of subsequent complaints concerning the 
same point of law.” 
A year later, on 12 May 2004, when 
approving ‘Protocol 14 to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Amending 
the Control System of the Convention’ 
(hereafter ‘Protocol 14’), the Committee 
of Ministers (the CoM) also adopted a 
Resolution, Res (2004) 3, which invited 
the Court to identify in its judgments 
those cases which revealed the existence 
of structural or systemic problems in 
the country concerned, especially if 
those problems were, or could become, 
the source of a large number of similar 
applications, in order to assist that 
country in finding an appropriate solution 
to the problem as a whole and the CoM 
in securing the implementation of the 
judgment concerned. 
The first pilot judgment was delivered 
by the Court in Broniowski v Poland (No. 
31443/96, 22/06/04), which found that 
the Polish authorities had failed to respect 
the property rights of nearly 80,000 
nationals who had been repatriated from 
eastern territories after the Second World 
War (see further the article below by 
Eleonora Davidyan). The Court concluded 
that the facts of the case disclosed the 
existence within the Polish legal order of 
a shortcoming, as a consequence of which 
a whole class of individuals had been, or 
were still, denied the peaceful enjoyment 
of their possessions. It also found that the 
deficiencies in national law and practice 
identified in the applicant’s individual case 
might give rise to numerous subsequent 
well-founded applications. 
The next pilot judgment was given in 
Xenides-Arestis v Turkey (No. 46347/99, 
22/12/05), where the Court found  
violations of Art. 8 (respect for private 
and family life) and Art. 1 of Protocol 
1 (protection of property) in respect of 
persons (mainly Greek Cypriots) who 
have been denied access to their homes 
located in northern Cyprus since the 
Turkish military occupation of 1974. Th e 
Court noted that 1,400 similar cases were 
pending before it. 
Th e most recent example of the 
Court’s application of this procedure 
is its judgment in Hutten-Czapska v 
Poland (No. 35014/97, 19/06/06), where 
Poland was found in violation of Art. 1 of 
Protocol 1 due to the malfunctioning of 
Polish housing legislation which imposed 
on individual landlords restrictions on 
increases in rent for their dwellings, 
making it impossible for them to receive 
rent reasonably commensurate with the 
general costs of property maintenance. It 
was established that such a defective rentcontrol 
scheme might potentially aff ect 
100,000 landlords and from 600,000 to 
900,000 tenants. 
In all these above-mentioned judgments 
the Court adjourned its consideration of 
current and future applications which 
raise the same issues as were decided in 
these cases. 
Although Protocol 14 does not 
contain an express concept of the pilot 
judgment procedure, it is considered to 
be in line with the reforms introduced 
by this Protocol and there are indications 
of the Court’s willingness and ability to 
apply it more extensively in the future. 
Furthermore, the Court was urged to 
do so. As indicated in the report of the 
Group of Wise Persons2 to the CoM of 10 
November 2006: “the Group encourages 
the Court to make the fullest possible use 
of the ‘pilot judgment’ procedure.” 
One of the most pressing questions that 
arises with the introduction of this new 
mechanism is how to eff ectively implement 
such judgments. Unlike the Court’s 
common practice, in the above cases it did 
require, albeit in very general terms, the 
Governments to take general measures in 
addition to compensation awarded to the 
applicants. In Broniowski v Poland, the 
Court stated that “the respondent State 
must, through appropriate legal measures 
and administrative practice, secure the 
implementation of the property right in 
question in respect of the remaining […] 
claimants or provide them with equivalent 
redress in lieu, in accordance with the 
principles of protection of property 
rights under Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1”. 
Th e concluding parts of the Xenides- 
Arestis v Turkey and Hutten-Czapska 
v Poland judgments contain similar 
wording, requiring the corresponding 
States to introduce certain corresponding 
measures. In the former, the Court also 
laid down a three-month time limit for 
such compliance. 
Some may argue that this new practice 
of the Court giving fairly detailed 
indications of the general measures to 
be taken, runs the risk of contradicting 
the principle that States should be 
free to choose the means of executing 
judgments and also lacks a clear legal 
basis. Obviously, by applying the pilot 
judgment procedure, the Court is making 
a step forward in interpreting Art. 46 of 
the Convention, which until recently had 
been understood as granting an exclusive 
right to the state to choose the requisite 
general measures, subject to supervision 
by the Committee of Ministers. It may 
well be the case that in future, as the 
practice of the pilot judgment procedure 
develops, it should be laid down in the 
Rules of the Court. 
In accordance with the newly revised 
‘Rules for the Supervision of the Execution 
of Judgments’ of 10 May 2006 [CM 
(2006) 90], the CoM will give priority to 
the supervision of judgments in which the 
Court has identifi ed a systemic problem 
(Rule 4, paragraph 1). Undoubtedly, it is 
an absolutely justifi ed measure, given the 
great number of persons whose interests 
are aff ected by each pilot judgment. It 
is of paramount importance to provide 
those applicants whose cases (raising the 
same problems as decided in the pilot 
judgment) have been adjourned by the 
Court, with procedural guarantees as to 
the State’s prompt and diligent compliance 
with the general measures indicated. Such 
guarantees could include establishing 
appropriate time limits for implementing 
the pilot judgments, and a requirement 
for the respondent State to produce 
a comprehensive plan of action and 
timetable for the corresponding reforms. 
Th is will also require comprehensive 
monitoring by the Council of Europe 
of the impact of the pilot judgments, as 
well as of the steps taken by the CoM 
and by the respondent State towards their 
implementation. 
To conclude, it is diffi cult to say, 
at the moment, if the pilot judgment 
procedure will contribute signifi cantly 
towards resolving the Court’s workload 
crisis and, more importantly, not at the 
expense of the individual applicants. Its 
success very much depends on the overall 
implementation of the new mechanisms, 
introduced by Protocol 14 and developed 
in the relevant CoM Resolutions. 
1 The views expressed in this article do not 
necessarily refl ect those of INTERIGHTS. 
2 Th e Group of Wise Persons was set up by the 
heads of the Council of Europe member states at the 
meeting in Warsaw on 16 and 17 May 2005 to consider 
the long-term eff ectiveness of the ECHR control 
mechanism, including the initial eff ects of Protocol 14. 
Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee 
of Ministers (2006) CM(2006)203, para. 140. 
 
